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ABSTRACT
The state-of-the-art for auditing and reproducing scientific
applications on high-performance computing (HPC) systems
is through a data provenance subsystem. While recent ad-
vances in data provenance lie in reducing the performance
overhead and improving the user’s query flexibility, the fi-
delity of data provenance is often overlooked: there is no
such a way to ensure that the provenance data itself has not
been fabricated or falsified. This paper advocates to lever-
age blockchains to deliver immutable and autonomous data
provenance services such that scientific data are trustworthy.
The challenges for adopting blockchains to HPC include de-
signing a new blockchain architecture compatible with the
HPC platforms and, more importantly, a set of new consen-
sus protocols for scientific applications atop blockchains. To
this end, we have designed the proof-of-scalable-traceability
(POST) protocol and implemented it in a blockchain proto-
type, namely SciChain, the very first blockchain system for
HPC. We evaluated SciChain by comparing it with multi-
ple state-of-the-art systems; Experimental results showed
that SciChain guaranteed trustworthy data while incurring
orders of magnitude lower overhead.
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The de facto way to audit and reproduce scientific research
and data is through data provenance, which tracks the entire
lifespan of the data during the experiments and simulation at
various phases such as data creation, data changes, and data
archival. Data provenance plays a critical role in guarantee-
ing the validity of scientific discoveries and research results,
as data fabrication and falsification could happen to meet re-
search objectives or personal interests or both. For instance,
the National Cancer Institute found 0.25% of trial data are
fraudulent in the year of 2015 [1]. In earth sciences, scientists
emphasized the importance of maintaining data provenance
in achieving the transparency of scientific discoveries [2].
Conventional provenance systems can be categorized into
two types: centralized provenance systems and distributed
provenance systems. One popular centralized provenance
system is SPADE [3], where the provenance (from various
data sources) is collected and managed by a centralized re-
lational database. Domain-specific systems based on such
centralized design paradigms are also available in biomed-
ical engineering [4], computational chemistry [5], among
others. Although having been reasonably adopted by vari-
ous disciples, the centralized provenance systems are being
increasingly criticized due to the exponentially-grown data:
the centralized provenance system becomes a performance
bottleneck and a single point of failure, and to this end, we
witness the boom of various distributed approaches toward
scalable provenance [6, 7]. Indeed, those distributed prove-
nance systems, mostly built upon distributed file systems
as opposed to centralized databases, eliminated the perfor-
mance bottleneck and proved to deliver orders of magnitude
higher performance than centralized approaches.
As a double-edged sword, however, distributed prove-
nance systems pose a new concern [8] on the provenance
itself: while the provenance is supposed to audit the
execution of the application, who then should audit
the provenance? Do we need to build the provenance of
provenance? So the recursion goes on and on, indefinitely.
Note that, this concern was not that critical in a centralized
approach as long as we can, which is the case, apply ro-
bust reliability mechanisms to the centralized node, however,
it becomes a very challenging problem for all the partic-
ipating nodes in a (large-scale) distributed system: if any
single node of the entire deployment is compromised, the
provenance as a whole becomes invalid. To this end, de-
centralized provenance systems were recently proposed
inspired by blockchains. These systems (e.g., ProvChain [9],
SmartProvenance [10], LineageChain [11]) are also called
blockchain-based provenance systems that are both temper-
evident and autonomous, thus guarantee trustworthy data.
The key idea of blockchain-based provenance systems is: in-
stead of storing the data on a single node or split it into n nodes,
let us replicate the data and maintain a hashed linkedlist
for each copy of the data. The replication guarantees the prove-
nance is tolerant to a certain degree of fault (e.g., ⌊ n−13 ⌋ in a
Byzantine system), and the hashed linkedlist guarantees that
the provenance data cannot be tampered with without being
noticed by a simple hash verification.
Nonetheless, multiple issues must be addressed before
blockchain-based provenance systems come to practical us-
age. For instance, there is a series of concerns on resource
utilization: the space efficiency is low, the network band-
width consumption is high, the CPU cycles are “wasted”
for meaningless mining, to name a few. Besides, all these
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blockchain-based provenance systems are built in such a way
that the underlying blockchain infrastructure is a black box,
and the provenance service works as a higher-level applica-
tion by calling the programming interfaces provided by the
blockchain infrastructure such as Hyperledger Fabric [12]
and Ethereum [13]. In the best case, the provenance ser-
vices might miss optimization and customization opportuni-
ties because the former cannot modify the lower blockchain
layer; to make it worse, the applicability of those blockchain-
based provenance systems is constrained by the underlying
blockchain infrastructure.
In the following, we highlight some limitations exhib-
ited from existing blockchain-based provenance systems in
the context of scientific computing and high-performance
computing (HPC) systems. (1) If the compute nodes of the
scientific experiments have no local disks, which is very com-
mon for large-scale HPC systems, then the blockchain-based
provenance system (at least in its current form) becomes
useless as all blockchain systems require node-local persis-
tent storage. (2) If the consensus protocol of the underlying
blockchain system is inappropriate for the scientific applica-
tions, then again, the provenance system becomes useless.
To make the matter more concrete, the popular proof-of-
work (PoW) consensus protocol is taken by many public
blockchains that can hardly be applied to large-scale scien-
tific simulations: it is nonsense to ask every single com-
pute node to (re-)run the experiments. (3) If the experi-
ment testbed has a multi-tiered storage architecture (e.g.,
burst buffers, I/O nodes, remote parallel file systems), the
blockchains will be agnostic of such heterogeneity, leading
to sub-optimal performance.
In summary, a highly desired provenance system for sci-
entific applications should be crafted with a balance between
scalability, reliability, and applicability. Unfortunately, exist-
ing provenance systems failed to meet the above unique re-
quirements from scientific computing the HPC communities.
Of note, a recent work [14] indeed proposed a blockchain-
like provenance system deployed to diskless compute nodes
(the so-called in-memory blockchain, IMB), IMB simply took
the remote parallel filesystem as a pseudo independent local
disk, which brought limited insight and was not evaluated
against real-world blockchain systems.
1.2 Proposed Approach
This paper proposes a new decentralized approach tomanage
the data provenance of scientific applications deployed to
HPC systems. Rather than only taking an existing blockchain
system as a block box, we hack into blockchain internals to
improve the applicability and performance of provenance
services built upon blockchains. Specifically, we design a new
blockchain architecture supporting multi-tier storage and
then devise new consensus protocols aiming to optimize the
decentralized provenance services in an HPC environment.
Specifically, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose a new architecture for secure and reli-
able decentralized data provenance on HPC systems.
The new architecture is tailored to the HPC environ-
ment: compute nodes can maintain the blockchain in
local memory while using distributed shared ledger
as a persistent medium for enhanced reliability and
as a precaution for any catastrophes (e.g., compute
nodes failure or restart).
• Wedesign a set of consensus protocols, namely, proof-
of-scalable-traceability (POST), for validating appli-
cations’ data provenance following a push/pull mech-
anism that promises memory optimization. The key
idea of POST is that the consensus comes not only
from the fellow compute nodes through PoW but
also from the remote shared storage through proof-
of-extended-traceability (POET). POET comes into
action only if the compute nodes are unable to reach
consensus, thus significantly reducing the commu-
nication overhead between the compute nodes and
the shared storage.
• We prove the liveness of the proposed consensus
protocols. In particular, we show that all of the par-
ticipating nodes would eventually reach consensus
in front of arbitrary failures.
• We implement a system prototype, SciChain, and
experimentally verify the system’s effectiveness with
more than one million transactions derived from
both micro-benchmarks and real-world applications
on up to 1,024 nodes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
review the background and related work on blockchains and
data provenance in §2. §3 presents the POST protocol along
with its complexity analysis and liveness proof. We detail
the implementation of SciChain, a fully-fledged blockchain
systemwith the POST protocol in §4. §5 reports experimental
results by comparing SciChain with other state-of-the-art
systems.We finally conclude the paper with future directions
in §6.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
A blockchain system is a distributed ledger that consists of
multiple nodes that are either fully or partially trustworthy.
Even while most of the nodes are honest, some nodes tend to
exhibit Byzantine behavior because of the unexpected attack.
All the nodes are responsible for generating, validating, and
appending blocks with transactions in their local ledger as
well as maintain a shared replica of a blockchain or ledger
(i.e., a set of shared blocks of transactions) and global states.
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Figure 1: Conventional blockchain architecture.
In a blockchain-like distributed ledger, more than 50% nodes
need to provide consensus to validate a block.
Two of the most popular types of blockchain systems
so far, in terms of access permissions, are public and pri-
vate blockchains. Other types are derived from these two
basic types, such as inter-blockchains [15, 16]. In the pri-
vate blockchain system (i.e., permissioned network), a node
requires special permission. The network initiator then ei-
ther verifies the node or prepares a set of rules to verify the
node. This mechanism puts a restriction on who is allowed to
participate in the network, and only in certain transactions.
Once a node joins the network, it starts to play a role in
maintaining the blockchain in a decentralized manner. In
a public blockchain network, anyone can join and partici-
pate. The network follows an incentivizing mechanism to
encourage more participants to join the network. However,
public blockchain systems have mainly two downsides. First,
the openness of public blockchain supports weak security.
Second, to fill up the security gap, each node requires to
solve a puzzle and the difficulty in the puzzle needs to be
increased along with the scaling of the node.
Several consensus protocols have been followed in the
blockchain systems in order to validate blocks such as proof-
of-work (PoW), proof-of-stake (PoS), and practical byzantine
fault tolerance (PBFT). In PoW, each node in the network
needs to solve a complex puzzle that needs a significant
amount of computation, and the node that solves the puzzle
is incentivized [17]. In PoS, the creator of a new block is cho-
sen in a deterministic way, based on the wealth (i.e., stake)
of the node and there is no reward for mining a block [18].
In PBFT, all of the nodes (partially trusted) within the sys-
tem extensively communicate with each other in order to
reach an agreement about the state of the system through a
majority [19].
Figure 1 shows the system architecture of conventional
blockchains deployed to a shared-nothing cluster. Regard-
less of private (Hyperledger [12]) or public (Ethereum [13]),
all existing blockchain systems assume that the underly-
ing computer infrastructure is shared-nothing: the memory
Figure 2: HPC blockchain architecture.
Figure 3: POST consensus.
subsystems and I/O subsystems are all independent on the
participant nodes who are often connected through com-
modity networking such as Ethernet. In contrast, Figure 2
illustrates one possible blockchain deployment on HPC.
Data provenance tracks the source of data and the move-
ment among the different data sources [20]. It facilitates the
debugging process that helps to ensure the reproducibility of
results. Therefore, security and privacy issues, e.g., integrity,
confidentiality, and availability, are major concerns [8]. State-
of-the-art filesystem-based provenance systems [6, 7], and
their variants such as in-memory blockchains [14], lack ab-
stractions that are essential for enabling trustworthy and
reliability in provenance, calling for evaluations of the practi-
cal effectiveness of trustworthy provenance techniques [21].
3 PROTOCOLS
The proposed proof-of-scalable-traceability (POST) protocol,
which is designed to optimizememory consumption, consists
of two phases of protocols, as shown in Figure 3. In the first
protocol (i.e., Phase 1), persist-in-shared-storage (i.e., Push
method), the shared storage is being leveraged in order to
keep ledger replica with minimum communication overhead
as all ledgers on compute nodes are necessarily volatile. The
second protocol (i.e., Phase 2), proof-of-extended-traceability,
further extends the first protocol by pushing the storage node
into a more active position: whenever a new block is created,
it will be validated by the compute nodes first, and if more
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than 50% compute nodes are compromised, the distributed
shared storage participates in the validation process (i.e., Pull
method). Details of each protocol are as follows.
3.1 PSS: Persist in Shared Storage
The protocol is described in Protocol 1. The key idea is, a
batch of new transactions are stored to the blockchain and
persisted to a parallel file system (e.g., GPFS), as shown in
Line 5 and Line 10. That is, the blocks of transactions are
appended to the compute nodes’ memory first based on the
validation achieved from Protocol 2 shown in Line 4. It should
be noted that we only keep the most recent blocks within
the scope of the compute nodes’ memory to minimize the
memory overhead. This is because, if more than 50% compute
nodes can not validate a new block based on the current
blocks available in memory, which is rare, they can always
use the Pull method (i.e., Protocol 2) to retrieve the latest
blocks from the shared storage to synchronize. If more than
50% compute nodes can validate the block as shown in Line
9, the block is persisted in the shared storage as well (i.e.,
Push method). Doing so adds an extra layer of reliability to
the data on volatile memory. However, the block validation
and replication process both in the compute nodes and in
the shared storage should not exhibit significant overhead.
This is addressed in Line 2, where we check first the shared
storage before starting the block appending process. That is,
we start accessing the compute nodes only when the block is
not validated and appended already in the persistent medium
(i.e., shared storage). Then the questions arise, what if the
shared storage gets compromised, and how frequently the
storage is accessed. It should be noted that the persistent
medium is accessed only once when more than 50% compute
nodes agreed on the validation of a block, as shown in Line
9, which ensures exceptionally light communication among
the compute nodes and shared storage while making the
shared storage secure.
The theoretical time complexity of this protocol isO(|M |),
and |M | could be a reasonably large number (e.g., tens of
thousands of cores in leading-class supercomputers [22]),
which is on par with the original PoW consensus. We will
demonstrate the effectiveness of the protocol in the evalua-
tion section. The correctness of Protocol 1 is evident because
the only change to the original PoW consensus is the data
persistence, which has nothing to do with the agreement
between the compute nodes. The main goal of this first pro-
tocol is to help the consensus protocol (i.e., Protocol 3) in
continuing the block validation process with the help of our
proof-of-extended-traceability protocol (i.e., protocol 2).
3.2 POET: Proof of Extended Traceability
POET (i.e., Protocol 2) works in two steps. First, it checks
whether it can validate a block with the help of in-memory
Protocol 1 Persisting in-memory blocks to shared storage
Require: Compute nodes M where the i-th node is M i ;
M iB the local blockchain onM
i ; a newly mined block b;
shared storage S ; SB the blockchain copy on the shared
storage;
Ensure: Persist b to S andM after validating it by 51% com-
pute node list VNodes
1: function Persist-in-Shared-Storage(b,M , S)
2: if b < SB then ▷ Need only one look-up
3: forMi ∈ M do
4: if b is valid withM iB then ▷ Protocol 2
5: M iB ← M iB ∪ b
6: VNodes ← VNodes ∪M iB
7: end if
8: end for
9: if |VNodes | > N2 then ▷ Protocol 3
10: SB ← SB ∪ b ▷ Push method
11: end if
12: end if
13: end function
blockchains stored in the compute nodes, as shown in Line
3. If the in-memory blockchains are sufficient enough to
validate a block, the block is then stored both in the compute
nodes (i.e., Line 5) as well as in the shared storage (i.e., Line
20). However, if more than 50% compute nodes fail, which is
rare, the storage node then comes forward (i.e., Pull method)
to proceed further with the block validation process (i.e., Line
11). If the storage node can complete the validation process
successfully, the block is then stored both in the compute
node (i.e., Line 15) and the shared storage node (i.e., Line 12).
It should be noted that the shared storage is accessed only
once either when more than 50% compute nodes agree on
the validation of the block as shown in Line 20 or when the
block is validated for the first time against the shared storage
in case of more than 50% compute nodes failure as shown in
Line 12.
The benefits of this new validation method are two folds:
(i) A faster validation process achieved by the agreement of
the compute nodes, thanks to the in-memory support, (ii) An
extended and stable validation support is achieved from the
shared storage that serves as a reliable persistent medium
if more than 50% compute nodes are compromised or fail
to provide consensus. The time complexity of Protocol 2 is
O(|M |), which is on par with the original PoW consensus.
However, it is possible to reduce the number of iterations if
we assign more weight to the shared storage.
3.3 POST: Proof of Scalable Traceability
To achieve the consensus in POST as shown on Figure 3, both
Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 are included to achieve Protocol 3,
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Protocol 2 Proof-of-Extended-Traceability on storage
Require: Compute nodes M where the i-th node is M i ;
M iB the local blockchain on M
i ; a newly mined block
b; shared storage S ; SB the blockchain copy on the stor-
age;
Ensure: b is validated by both the local SciChain ledgerM iB
and the remote persistent ledger SB , and then appended
to allMB ’s and SB .
1: function Proof-of-Extended-Traceability(b,M , S)
2: forMi ∈ M do
3: if b is valid withM iB then
4: if b < M iB then
5: M iB ← M iB ∪ b ▷ Protocol 1
6: VNodes ← VNodes ∪M iB
7: end if
8: end if
9: end for
10: if |VNodes | <= N2 then ▷ Compute nodes fail?
11: if b is valid with SB and b < SB then ▷ Pull
method
12: SB ← SB ∪ b ▷ Protocol 1
13: forMi ∈ M do
14: if b < M iB then
15: M iB ← M iB ∪ b
16: end if
17: end for
18: end if
19: else ▷ Persist valid block in storage
20: SB ← SB ∪ b ▷ Protocol 1
21: end if
22: end function
by which it is ensured that most of the compute nodes (more
than 50%) ensure the validity of the newly proposed block’s
hash after solving the compute-intensive problem (i.e., the
“puzzle”) from all respective in-memory blocks previously-
stored in all compute nodes and the shared storage. If 51%
compute nodes get compromised, it is guaranteed that at-
least the shared storage can ensure the validity. As shown in
Line 3 of Protocol 3, all of the compute nodes in the network
attempt to solve the puzzle for the newly proposed block, and
the block will only be appended to the shared storage, and
the compute nodes (shown at Lines 13 and 15) if more than
50% nodes agree on the validity of the new block. If at-least
51% compute nodes are unable to provide the consensus (i.e.,
Line 7), then the remote storage node starts to validate the
block (i.e., Line 8) in order to achieve 51% consensus jointly
from compute nodes and remote storage node. This mecha-
nism helps to reduce the communication overhead between
the compute nodes and the remote shared storage during
consensus reaching process, because, the shared storage will
only be accessed if more than 50% compute nodes fail for
some reason (e.g., out-of-memory error or restart).
Protocol 3 All compute and storage nodes reach consensus
Require: Compute nodesM where the i-th node isM i ;M iB
the local blockchain onM i ; a new blockb; shared storage
S ; SB the blockchain copy on the storage;
Ensure: At least 50% compute node list VNodes who vali-
date b both with local blockchain and with remote per-
sistent ledger SB .
1: function POST-Consensus(b,M , S)
2: forMi ∈ M do
3: if b is valid withM iB then
4: VNodes ← VNodes ∪M iB ▷ Consensus from
compute nodes
5: end if
6: end for
7: if |VNodes | <= N2 then ▷ Checks if 51% nodes
provide consensus
8: if b is valid with SB then
9: VNodes ← VNodes ∪ SB ▷ Consensus from
storage nodes
10: end if
11: else ▷ Protocol 1
12: forMi ∈ M do
13: M iB ← M iB ∪ b
14: end for
15: SB ← SB ∪ b
16: end if
17: end function
As the Protocol 3 utilizes both Protocol 1 and Protocol 2
and does impact the agreement formation between partic-
ipant nodes and the storage node. Therefore, we need to
demonstrate that the new protocol indeed leads to consen-
sus, meaning that at least 50% of the compute nodes are
guaranteed to hold the longest (same) ledgers in front of ar-
bitrary attacks. Therefore, formally, we provide the following
theorem.
3.4 Liveness of POST
In this section, the non-blocking property of the POST proto-
col is demonstrated. That is, the consensus reaching process
(i.e., voting) will not be blocked due to the fail/restart of the
nodes. To be more explicit, there is no “partial consensus”
(i.e., either reached or cancelled) as long as the failed nodes
can eventually recover. In the context of transactions, it is
also referred to as commit and abort. In distributed comput-
ing, this non-blocking property is also called liveness.
As demonstrated in [23], there are two necessary and
sufficient conditions to ensure a non-blocking protocol:
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C1 Between commit and abort, there exists no such state
which could help us to make a decision.
C2 There is no direct link between an indeterministic1
state and a committed state.
The proof states as follows. To verify C1, let’s assume
the node P who initiates the transaction fails after (m − 1)
other nodes have validated P ’s request. That is, totalm nodes,
including P itself, have verified the transaction before P are
failed and restarted. There are two cases to consider:
• Ifm <= N2 , then P has not committed anything be-
cause the execution is incomplete according to Line
7 of Protocol 3. In other words, the state always indi-
cates an abort, and the restarted P node will simply
forward the transaction to fellow nodes to start the
verification.
• Ifm > N2 +1, then P should have persisted the change
to the disk according to Line 11 of Protocol 3 and
Line 20 of Protocol 2. In this case, when P restarts, it
will definitely lead to a commit status.
Therefore, we see that no matter how many nodes have
verified the transactions requested by P before the latter fails,
for each possible case, there is only one possible outcome.
That is, we never need to decide a commit or abort operation
given a specific case. C1 is thus satisfied.
It is simple to verify C2 because POST does not exhibit
an indeterministic state. Once P restarts, it simply checks
whether the transaction is stored in the persistent storage.
If so, P will mark the transaction completed—a “commit”
state; otherwise, P will resend everything and restart the
consensus procedure—an “abort” state. C2 is thus satisfied.
4 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 Overview
We have implemented a prototype system of the proposed
blockchain architecture and consensus protocols with about
2,000 lines of Java code. At this point, we only release the core
modules of the prototype; some complementary components
and plug-ins are still being tested with more edge cases and
will be released once they are stable enough. The source code
is currently hosted on Github.
Figure 4 illustrates the overview of the implemented ar-
chitecture of the proposed SciChain. The prototype system
currently runs on a virtualized environment where (i) each
node is executed with a user-level thread, (ii) local ledgers
are stored on as (distinct) files, and (iii) network latency is
throttled by a time delay parameterized by arbitrary statisti-
cal distributions (with average, variance, random seed). The
prototype is being packaged into dockers to be conveniently
deployed to production systems.
1An indeterministic state is defined as a state from which no final decision
can be made.
Figure 4: Overview of system interaction in SciChain.
As shown on Figure 4, newly transactions generated by
the nodes are first encrypted using SHA-256 algorithm [24]
(step 1). Then, the transactions are encapsulated in a block
by the respective nodes (step 2) before being pushed into
a queue (step 3), from which the queued blocks are prop-
agated across the network (step 4). Finally, the blocks are
validated both in compute nodes (step 5) and optionally, in
the shared storage (step 6) (i.e., Pull) to achieve POST con-
sensus before storing them in the shared storage (step 7) (i.e.,
Push) and the compute nodes (step 8). It should be noted that
the shared storage takes part in the validation process (i.e.,
step 6), only if more than 50% compute nodes are unable to
provide consensus (i.e., step 5).
As proposed in [25], each blockchain system can be de-
composed into four main components: ledger, consensus,
cryptography, and smart contract. Because this paper fo-
cuses on ledger and consensus, we take SHA-256 [24] as the
cryptography function for the chained blocks. The current
system implementation does not support smart contract: we
wrap up the applications using pseudo transactions with
dummy numerical values such that the prototype can take
in a variety of applications. The remainder of this section
focuses on the ledger and consensus implementation.
4.2 Node Threads
An unique user-level thread is generated for representing
each node. All the properties of the node, such as node ID,
a pointer to the local file, node type (storage or sensor), are
stored in a Node object. More details about the data and
storage structure will be discussed in §4.4.
The nodes in our system prototype are implemented with
user-level threads spawning transactions in random orders
with a fixed time interval. The threads are responsible for
packing the transactions into blocks; each block comprises at
6
Figure 5: Data structure of SciChain transactions.
least twelve transactions such that the launching overhead is
amortized and negligible to each transaction. The blocks are
then pushed into the network queue that will be discussed in
the following section §4.3. The nodes are also responsible for
processing the block (e.g., mining block in Bitcoin), which
will be discussed in §4.5.
4.3 Network Queues
All of newly submitted blocks by the nodes are pushed into a
FIFO queue. Similarly to how the blocks of transactions are
spawned, a block also periodically pops out from the head of
the queue at a fixed time interval, which then is transferred
to the connected nodes.
Because there are different latencies among the nodes
in the real network based on different kinds of connection
types; therefore, in the proposed solution, each peer connec-
tion is set with specific network latency. For instance, the
InfiniBand connection latency between two nodes is 2 mi-
croseconds [26], whereas, in the case of Ethernet connection,
the latency between two nodes is set with 250 microsec-
onds [27].
It could be argued that a queue might not deliver data at
a sufficient rate to feed the network because a queue is a
linear data structure that can hardly be parallelized for the
sake of scalability. This is alleviated by the following two
approaches in our implementation. First, we adjust the time
interval more substantial than the latency for the queue to
pop an element. In doing so, the overhead from the queue
itself is masked completely. Second, we implement the queue
using a loosely-coupled linked-lists such that the queue can
be split and reconstructed arbitrarily.
4.4 Data Models and Storage
The data structure for the proposed SciChain ledger is a
linked list and stored in a row-wise table where each tuple
corresponds a block, which references a list of transaction
records stored in another table, just like the traditional re-
lational database tables. Figure 5 shows a concrete example
of the structure to store the blockchain on a specific node
(i.e., Node 1). The block genesis indicates the very first block
of the blockchain for that node. Each cell under the node
represents a block. For example, under Node 1, Block 1_2
indicates the second block created by Node 1 and is a child
of the genesis block. Block 1_2 is also the parent of Block
4_2, which is created by Node 4. Block 4_2 is appended as
the child of Block 1_2 when Node 4 successfully appends
this block and broadcasts it to other nodes. In addition to
the inter-compute-node propagation, the new block is also
persisted and validated on the Shared Storage Node, which
is the bookkeeper of the ground truth of the decentralized
blockchains.
4.5 Consensus Protocols
The consensus protocol between compute nodes, as a build-
ing block of the proposed POST consensus, shares the same
essence of the traditional PoW but simplifies the compute-
intensive puzzle taken by Bitcoin [28]. Specifically, our PoW
does require a nonce number to mine and validate the new
block. Generally speaking, the nonce value serves as the
knob controlling the balance between efficiency and trust-
worthiness. The default nonce is set to one for the sake of
efficiency, and we will report the sensitivity in §5.4.
Firstly, all the newly created transactions generated in a
node added to that node as well as are propagated to other
peers and eventually packed into a block by all the peers
in the network for the preparation of starting the mining
process.
Secondly, all the compute nodes will first attempt to vali-
date and add the block to its local replica of the blockchain.
The node who will first be able to solve the puzzle (i.e., min-
ing) for the newly created block, will append the block in
its local in-memory blockchain as well as in the remote stor-
age and will receive the reward or credit. If more than 50%
compute nodes are unable to provide a consensus about the
block, the remote storage will then come forward to vali-
date the block through the POET protocol. If the block does
not get validated in this round, it is pushed into a waiting
queue in the respective compute node so that the block can
be processed by the node later. This is the step where we
follow the conventional proof-of-work (PoW) among the
compute nodes but differently with a customized PoW (i.e.,
POST) especially for the scientific data provenance, which is
proof-of-extended-traceability by the ground truth held by
the storage node in case of 50% compute nodes failure.
Thirdly, when the block is appended successfully to the
(local) blockchain by a node and the shared storage, it will
then be propagated to the other peers in the network to
make it validated; so that we can achieve the consensus. In
essence, the first node who actually is able to validate the
block will be the node appending it (i.e., the new block) to
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the local blockchain and propagate the block to the entire
network, and all other nodes in the network, after verifying
the validity of the new block, will also update their local
blockchains accordingly.
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Experiment Setup
5.1.1 Testbed. We leverage BlockLite [29] for large-scale
experiments. The network latency of InfiniBand is two mi-
croseconds [26]; The network latency of Ethernet is 250
microseconds [27]. We deploy the system prototype mostly
on 100 nodes except for the scalability test, where we use
1,024 nodes (Intel Core-i7 4.2 GHz CPU along with 32 GB
2400 MHz DDR4 memory).
5.1.2 Evaluated Systems. We evaluate the SciChain proto-
type against two other blockchain systems. The first blockchain
is a Conventional Blockchain system deployed to a shared-
nothing clusterwith Ethernet connections. The second blockchain
is a Memory-only Blockchain with high-performance net-
working interconnections (i.e., InfiniBand, RDMA) without
any persistent storage; this is not a practical solution due to
the lack of data persistence but is considered as the perfor-
mance upper bound of the proposed SciChain. We implement
all three blockchain systems in Java and make a reasonable
effort in optimizing all of them.
5.1.3 Workload. For micro-benchmarks, the transaction
format used in our evaluation is similar to funds transfer
between bank accounts. At the beginning of the transaction,
the system checks whether the submitted transaction is valid.
If so, the statuses (balances) of two nodes are updated accord-
ingly, followed by the propagation of the updates to all other
nodes in the network. On average, each block contains about
twelve transactions in our experiments. We deploy more
than one million transactions (1,036,303) to the system pro-
totype, and compare it to the other two baseline blockchain
systems.
For real-world applications, The testing workload is de-
rived from a trace of the FusionFS [30] filesystem initially
deployed to a 1,024-node cluster at the Argonne National
Laboratory. The trace includes four real-world scientific ap-
plications: Plasma Physics, Turbulence, AstroPhysics, and
Parallel BLAST [31]. We assign random numerical values to
the I/O operations traced in FusionFS such that the SciChain
prototype can take in the provenance in the same way as
other blockchain systems.
5.2 Trustworthy
This section demonstrates that the proposed POST consen-
sus can be achieved by more than 50% of participants. In
other words, we want to show that introducing the shared
Figure 6: POST guarantees more than 50% of nodes
holding valid blocks.
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Figure 7: Latency overhead of SciChain compared to
the Baseline. (Nonce = 1)
storage as an additional node does not reduce the portion
of good compute nodes to under 51%. To put it in another
way, we want to verify whether the new consensus protocol
leads to the same longest valid blockchain compared to other
consensus protocols such as PoW from the compute nodes.
Note that we prove the safety and liveness in Section 3; we
will experimentally verify the trustworthiness and reliability
here.
To demonstrate the trustworthiness and reliability, we
run the system prototype given random transactions for 10
minutes, and repeat the execution 15 times. As we can see in
Figure 6, all of the 15 executions lead to more than 50% nodes
holding the correct blockchains: 13 out of 15 executions
yield more than 90% validity while two executions exhibit
lower ratios because we terminate the execution (i.e., 10
minutes) once more than 50% nodes hold the correct blocks.
The bottom line is that we need to guarantee at least 51%
nodes’ data are not tampered with, which is the case.
5.3 Overhead
This section reports the provenance overhead incurred by
the proposed SciChain. The memory-only, baseline system
persists the data provenance to the disk with no security or
audibility guarantees. We turn on SciChain atop the baseline
and measure the end-to-end block processing time compared
to the baseline performance.
As shown in Figure 7, we observe the overhead incurred
by the proposed SciChain is noticeable (25% – 30%) at small
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Figure 8: Performance sensitivity with different levels
of puzzle difficulty.
scales of 20 and 40 nodes. This is the price we have to pay
to achieve high security. The good news is, however, the
overhead is reduced to under 20% on larger scales; in partic-
ular, the overhead is only 15% on 100 nodes. That is, unlike
conventional provenance systems whose overhead increases
proportionally to the number of nodes, SciChain’s overhead
ratio does not significantly increase.
5.4 Sensitivity
A critical parameter in PoW-based blockchains is how to con-
trol the computational complexity to select the winner who
can append the new block. A large nonce implies high trust-
worthy and low performance, while a small nonce indicates
high performance and more vulnerability. The canonical ap-
proach is to ask the node to find a “nonce” number, combined
with the hash value of the previous block, which will result
in a hash value of the current block in a specific format, usu-
ally with a certain number of zeros. We will use the short
term nonce-number to indicate the number of leading zeros
required by the PoW consensus. Because the proposed POST
consensus is a variant of PoW, we want to study how the
nonce number impacts the performance of the system.
Figure 8 reports how different puzzle difficulties introduce
the overhead; we use ‘nonce-x’ to indicate that x leading
zeros are required. In this experiment, x ranges from one to
six. We see the trends of all nonce numbers follow a similar
ascent pattern at different scales, which is understandable
because of the higher communication cost at larger scales.
A more interesting observation is that the performance im-
pact from larger nonce values is more significant than the
scale. For instance, at nonce-5, the appending time is still
under 70 seconds on 100 nodes; In contrast, the append-
ing time of nonce-6 on 20 nodes exceeds 200 seconds. This
result is essential for future HPC-crafted blockchains: the
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Figure 9: Scalability of three blockchain systems.
scalability challenge will still exist, but the solution should
be co-designed with a wise choice of nonce number. One
possible solution is to design an adaptive nonce value corre-
sponding to the dynamic scales of applications, however, it
is beyond the scope of this paper, and we will leave this as
an open question to the community and probably target this
in our future work.
5.5 Scalability
Figure 9 reports the performance of the three systems on
20-, 40-, 60-, 80-, and 100-node scales. The memory-only
blockchain, as expected, achieves the highest performance
(i.e., lowest processing time). The proposed SciChain with
shared storage does not exhibit significant slowdown than
the upper bound; for instance at 100-node scale, the compar-
ison is 157 ms vs. 311 ms, at the same order of magnitude.
However, the conventional blockchain on 100 nodes appends
a new block in 3,231 ms, significantly slower than SciChain.
Specifically, SciChain shows significant speedup in perfor-
mance compared with existing systems: 3,231311 = 10.4×.
In addition to reporting the average performance of three
blockchain systems, we draw the cumulative density func-
tion (CDF) of their performance in Figure 10. The conven-
tional blockchain shows long-tail issues at various scales (e.g.,
60-node, 80-node, 100-node). The memory-only blockchain
also has long-tails problems multiple scales as well: 40-node
and 60-node. The proposed SciChain does not exhibit long
tails and has a low and smooth variance at all scales.
5.6 Large-Scale Applications
We study a trace of the FusionFS [30] filesystem initially
deployed to a 1,024-node cluster at the Argonne National
Laboratory. Four real-world scientific applications are be-
ing traced: Plasma Physics, Turbulence, AstroPhysics, and
Parallel BLAST [31], all of which run for five hours. These
applications cover a broad spectrum of I/O patterns exhibited
by scientific applications [32]. We assign random numerical
values to the I/O operations traced in FusionFS such that the
SciChain prototype can take in the provenance in the same
way as other blockchain systems. We execute the workloads
9
Figure 10: CDFs of three blockchains’ performance.
Figure 11: Latency distribution on 1,024 nodes.
by feeding the transactions into the system prototype de-
ployed on 1,024 nodes—the same scale when the applications
were executed at the Argonne National Laboratory.
As shown in Figure 11, the 1,024-node cluster appends a
new block in 6–7 seconds. We do observe a few outliers (data
points at 6.7 s and beyond along the X -axis), although the
quantity is tiny: only four out of 1,024 nodes, less than 0.4%.
The real difference is also insignificant, about 0.4 seconds out
of seven seconds. It should be noted that, each block consists
of more than 12 transactions. Therefore, on 1,024 nodes,
the provenance time incurred by SciChain is sub-second—a
reasonable, if not negligible, overhead for large-scale, hours-
long scientific applications in practice.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
This paper proposes a new blockchain consensus protocol,
namely POST, to enable immutable and autonomous data
provenance for scientific applications deployed to HPC sys-
tems. POST is implemented in a prototype system called Sci-
Chain, the first HPC-blockchain system toward trustworthy
data provenance in HPC. The effectiveness and efficiency
of POST are analyzed, and experimentally demonstrated
through both micro-benchmarks and real-world applications
on up to 1,024 nodes.
Our future work is two-fold. Firstly, the current POST
protocol does not consider the existence of burst buffers
available in many extreme-scale supercomputers. We believe
POST will be more efficient with the help of burst buffers
as a near-local storage option. Secondly, at this point, it
is unclear how to migrate the data stored in one specific
SciChain instance to another. This is also a challenge in
the blockchain community: ensuring the atomicity of the
transaction migration is far more complicated than it looks.
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